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In August of 2008, Russia invad-
ed Georgia in a military move that 
shocked the globe. The “Five Day 
War,” as it has been named, proved to 
be a short, but bloody war. Although 
provoked by fighting in South Osse-
tia, the Russian invasion appeared to 
be somewhat random and much more 
extensive than the world expected. 
This article utilizes Graham Allison’s 
rational model of decision making to 
wade through the propaganda and 
ascertain the thinking behind this 
move by Russia, as well as the after-
math of the decision. Through the 
lens of the rational model, it is clear 
that the decision by Russia to invade 
in a limited war provided the most 
benefits with the least amount of risk.
The Kremlin’s hand was forced to a 
decision during the night of August 
7, 2008. The events of the previous 
six months had culminated in a his-
toric moment. In February, Koso-
vo had declared independence, and 
the world watched as genocide and 
conflict ensued. Two months later, 
Ukraine and Georgia were denied 
a Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) following intense 
debate. Although denied, Georgia 
was promised a MAP “at some point” 
in the future if they still desired. Skir-
mishes, bombings, and other military 
conflicts were ongoing in the regions 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
Georgia. The two regions under dis-
pute hosted Russian peacekeepers, as 
well as Russian military bases, who 
worked alongside separatist forces in 
each area. The Russian military con-
ducted patrols along the border of 
Georgia beginning on July 15. These 
exercises were intended to prepare 
the Russian 58th army for an “oper-
ation of peace enforcement” in either 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Although 
these operations ended on August 
2, these troops continued to be sta-
tioned at the border until the war 
started on the 8th.
All of these events came to a head 
when Mikheil Saakashvili, the Pres-
ident of Georgia, ordered troops to 
restore constitutional order in South 
Ossetia late on August 7th. Saakash-
vili had been given intelligence by 
Georgian soldiers that Russian troops 
were moving through the Roki Tun-
nel in force, presumably intending 
to invade. There is much debate over 
whether the Russians invaded first 
or the Georgians attacked South 
Ossetia. The Georgians assert that 
Russia invaded and forced Saakash-
vili to return fire. The Russians argue 
Saakashvili attacked South Osse-
tia randomly in the night to regain 
control of the provinces. Regardless 
of which occurred first, Russia was 
forced to make a decision in response 
to Saakashvili’s military action in 
South Ossetia. 
In order to fully understand this de-
cision, the in-depth factors that pre-
cipitated the decision and provided 
the rationale for the Kremlin’s po-
sition must be assessed. The first is 
the Kosovo precedent. When Kosovo 
declared its independence in Febru-
ary of 2008, intervention by NATO 
and the United States angered Russia 
and fueled fears of losing influence in the 
Caucuses. At the time, intervention was 
cited as necessary for humanitarian rea-
sons:  to stop the mass genocide and eth-
nic cleansing that was occurring. Russia 
utilized this precedent of Western inter-
vention when legitimizing the decision to 
invade Georgia. 
In reference to humanitarian concerns, 
Putin also compared the overnight 
bombing of Tskhinvali to the Srebrenica 
genocide in 1995. The Kremlin accused 
Georgia of attempting genocide against 
South Ossetians, claiming that over two 
thousand civilian citizens had died and 
insinuating that by taking action, Rus-
sia would just be following suit with the 
West. 
In addition, the ability of Russia to claim 
that South Ossetians and Abkhazians are 
Russian citizens came from a policy of 
“passportization,” which began in 2002. 
This streamlined process allowed citizens 
of surrounding countries to easily gain 
Russian citizenship. Though controver-
sial, passportization allowed Russia to 
attempt to legitimize impinging upon a 
neighboring country’s sovereignty. De-
spite this attempt, the international com-
munity has not recognized these citizen-
ships unless the citizens have renounced 
Georgian citizenship officially. Therefore, 
Russia uses passportization as legitimacy, 
but it is ineffective. However, the Koso-
vo precedent provided Russia with nec-
essary legitimation for the decision the 
Kremlin was about to make.
The rational model of decision making, 
outlined by Graham Allison, contains 
several basic tenets. One of these is the 
precept that the principal actor is a na-
tional government or state. In this case, 
the principal actor is Russia. Russia acts 
unitarily in this decision, despite reports 
of disagreement and discord between 
Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin 
(president and prime minister, respec-
tively, at the time of the war). 
 
There is little consensus over who was 
actually making the decisions among the 
Russian elite. Many are now saying that 
Putin was in control, although he should 
not have been involved in foreign policy 
as the Prime Minister. A new documen-
tary entitled “The Lost Day” was released 
on YouTube accusing Medvedev of slow-
ly responding to the war praised Putin 
for his assertiveness and leadership skills. 
Speculation indicates that perhaps this 
film is purely political to support Putin 
in the upcoming election. Putin made 
several comments while he was still pres-
ident regarding his policies of supporting 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia through 
“not declarative, but material support.” 
This indicates that it was well within Pu-
tin’s intentions to fully support separatist 
interests. Putin was also quoted as saying, 
“There was a plan in place, and I think it 
is no secret that Russia’s forces acted in 
accordance with this plan […] The Gen-
eral Staff drew up this plan somewhere in 
late 2006 or early 2007. I approved it.” Not 
only does this indicate that the invasion 
into Georgia may have been pre-planned, 
but also that it was predominantly Putin’s 
plan. Despite whose plan it actually was, 
the decision to invade was made by the 
state of Russia and executed unitarily, as 
per the rational model of decision mak-
ing.
Another key concept in the rational 
model is the idea that the action chosen 
is the value-maximizing option, given 
the state’s goals. Russia’s goals regarding 
Georgia cannot be separated from the 
Kremlin’s general foreign policy strate-
gies. Russia is highly concerned about 
NATO enlargement and understanding 
this helps to clarify both the intentions 
and the timing of the conflict. Georgia’s 
attempts to enter NATO in April sparked 
renewed fervor and fueled Russia’s inten-
tions. According to the 2008 Foreign Pol-
icy Concept of the Russian Federation, 
“Russia maintains its negative attitude to-
wards the expansion of NATO, notably to 
the plans of admitting Ukraine and Geor-
gia to the membership in the alliance, as 
well as to bringing the NATO military in-
frastructure closer to the Russian borders 
on the whole…” Thus, Russia was high-
ly committed to keeping Georgia from 
gaining membership in NATO. 
This goal ties in closely with the contin-
ued objective of Russia to maintain influ-
ence and control over the regions along 
the border. Maintaining Russian influ-
ence over the Caucuses, as well as de-
terring a Western advancement towards 
the border, has been a major goal of 
Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Russia sees itself as a global pow-
er, and desires to maintain this position, 
especially regionally. These interests pro-
vide clarity when thinking about Russia’s 
perspective on the importance of Georgia 
and its influence in the region.
Another of Russia’s goals concerning 
Georgia was to continue supporting the 
separatist forces in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, in hopes of absorbing the re-
gions into Russia or at least maintain 
regional influence. More than gaining 
these regions, Russia desired to prevent 
Georgia from regaining full control, thus 
increasing Western influence in the re-
gion. Russian regional hegemony has lost 
much of its potency since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The loss of territory 
and power that occurred has left Russia 
deeply concerned about increased West-
ern influence and control over the region. 
There is quite a bit of evidence, in fact, 
that Russia had intended to intervene in 
Georgia much earlier than August. In late 
May, Russian troops had entered Abkha-
zia in order to repair railroad tracks that 
were not functional. The railroad direct-
ly linked Georgia and Russia, allowing 
troops and equipment to move much fast-
er during the invasion. This, along with 
repeated skirmishes and provocations of 
the Georgian government, indicates that 
perhaps Russia was pre-planning an in-
vasion in order to regain predominance 
in the region.
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With these goals in mind, utilizing the ra-
tional model, one must consider the options 
available to Russia at the time of the decision. 
Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel have 
described four possible options that Russia 
could have taken. First, Russia could have 
remained passive and simply supported the 
separatist forces, as they had been doing by 
providing arms and peacekeepers, and avoid 
further engagement. Second, Russia could 
have initiated a large-scale, short-term inter-
vention, in which troops fully engage militar-
ily to defend the separatists, but return back 
to Russian territory after. Third, Russia could 
engage in limited war to fully control South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The last option was to 
invade completely and occupy either security 
zones or the whole of Georgia. 
If Russia had chosen to remain passive, it 
would have been inconsistent with the Rus-
sian Foreign Policy Concept, as well as with 
history. This option also would have under-
mined Russia’s support of the separatists be-
cause it would be clear that they did not have 
the full backing of the Russian government. 
The second option of short-term interven-
tion accomplishes many of the goals of lim-
ited war at similar cost, but does not provide 
the maximum benefits. Full invasion and 
occupation of Georgia provides maximum 
benefits to Russia, but with increased cost. 
Occupying Georgia would require much 
more military involvement and an exponen-
tially higher cost, due to the cost of installing 
a puppet government and maintaining order 
long-term. There would also have been major 
repercussions to Russia’s international rep-
utation. Even in the limited war that Russia 
waged in Georgia, the West detected echoes 
of a resurgent Cold War Russia. A complete 
invasion and occupation of Georgia would 
have rekindled anti-Russian sentiment akin 
to that of the Cold War era. These costs were 
too substantial to be chosen rationally.
Within the rational model, the principal 
actor makes the decision that is value-max-
imizing. Russia chose the option of limited 
war because it accomplished the most goals 
at the least cost. Limited war meant that Rus-
sia would invade, defeat Georgian forces, in-
crease and maintain control of the separatist 
provinces, and then cease. Russia accom-
plished this task within five days, although 
some sources state that forces did not leave 
until much later. After international calls for 
a ceasefire and much diplomatic negotiation, 
a ceasefire agreement was signed which end-
ed the war. During the five days of conflict, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other 
European Union leaders met with President 
Medvedev and President Saakashvili. Sar-
kozy drafted a peace plan, which was even-
tually agreed upon after much diplomatic 
wrangling. After the ceasefire was signed by 
both parties, debates continued concerning 
whether Russia would follow through with 
plans to evacuate troops and abide by the 
ceasefire. Much pressure from the interna-
tional community led to an eventual retreat 
and subsequent ending of war. 
Russia had successfully met the majority of 
its goals in the conflict, with the exception 
of completely ending Georgia’s control over 
the separatists. In a statement highlighting 
Russia’s success in goals regarding NATO, 
Medvedev illuminated, “For some of our 
partners, including NATO, it was a signal 
that they must think about geopolitical sta-
bility before making a decision to expand the 
alliance.” In other words, the war in Georgia 
warned NATO of the potential consequences 
of expansion towards Russia. 
The costs of the war were minimal for Russia, 
with Georgia suffering the majority of the ca-
sualties. The Independent Fact-Finding Mis-
sion on the Conflict of Georgia found that 
Russia lost 67 servicemen, while Georgia lost 
170 servicemen, 14 policemen, and 228 civil-
ians, with many more injured. In addition to 
human cost discrepancies, the Russian gov-
ernment did not suffer many political casu-
alties. Public opinion in Russia greatly sup-
ported the war due in part to governmental 
control and censorship of media in Russia. 
Western response to the war also demon-
strated that Russia would face very little con-
sequence for their actions. The West refused 
to choose sides between Russia and Georgia 
during the war, instead calling for a ceasefire. 
Since 2008, President Obama has pursued a 
policy to “reset” relations with Russia. This 
policy has not included any form of indict-
ment of the war in Georgia. As a result, Rus-
sia has succeeded in achieving many of its re-
gional goals with very few real consequences.
The aftermath of the Five Day War remains 
to be fully revealed. Not only did Georgia 
lose the war, but as noted earlier, it also sus-
tained a much higher degree of casualties. 
The impact on Georgians, both in the heart 
of the country and in the separatist regions, 
was profound. As of this writing, NATO has 
yet to offer Georgia a MAP. Although initial-
ly seen as the victims of the war, the Geor-
gian government has begun losing support 
as the media has focused on discovering the 
initiators of the conflict, rather than its full 
context. The Saakashvili government also 
sustained damage, as Western countries are 
now less convinced of Georgia’s ability to 
maintain law and order. The aftermath of the 
war for Russia, aside from meeting the goals 
previously discussed, has been comparative-
ly less damaging. Russia announced its rec-
ognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states. Despite this announce-
ment by Medvedev, very few other states 
have followed suit, indicating that perhaps 
Russia overstepped its bounds. 
Russian foreign policy towards Georgia con-
tinues to be ambiguous yet frosty. While 
there has yet to be another full-fledged war 
between the two states, much of the ten-
sion remains. When one regards this con-
flict through the lens of the rational model, 
however, one can ascertain the thinking of 
Russian policymakers and leaders. Clear 
links exist between Russia’s decisions and the 
statements and policies available on public 
record. Without question, Russia operates as 
a rational actor in the foreign policy world. 
Decisions are made based upon pragmatism 
and the selection of the value-maximizing 
option. All of these factors lead to the conclu-
sion that the decision to go to war with Geor-
gia in the summer of 2008 was a rational and 
calculated decision based upon an assess-
ment of the potential options. It will certainly 
be interesting to see how Russia implements 
future foreign policy objectives regarding the 
state of Georgia.
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